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A Cheshire Cat Affair:
The European-type Company and Its
Meaning for the American Enterprise
in the European Community
JOSEPH JUDE NORTON*
"Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin," thought Alice; "but a grin
without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in all my lifel"1
By the end of this century there will probably come to be a new
"governance" of Western Europe which will have a direct and monumen-
tal impact on the economic, social and political lives of some 400 million
Europeans.2 Accordingly, if it is a sound democratic principle that a
* Member of the Texas Bar; Lecturer in Law, Southern Methodist University. B.A.
1966, Providence College; LL.B. 1969, University of Edinburgh (Scotland); LL.M. 1970,
University of Texas; LL.M. 1972, SJ.D. candidate, University of Michigan.
1. L. CARROLL, ALICE's AnvNanms IN WONDERlAND 94 (1866).
2. See, e.g., Mitchell, The Governance of Europe-A New Dimension in International
Relations, in BRITAIN AND THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (Heriot-Watt University Lectures1971). ..
The term "European Community" in its full sense embraces the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). As used in this paper, however, "European
Community" will be interchangeable with the EEC. The original members of the Com-
munity are: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The
three new acceding members are: Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. To gain
some insight into the statistical dimensions of the Community the following figures
(1970) may prove helpful:
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people should have effective control over those decisions which determine
their lives, then it is reasonable to conceive that a primary evolving con-
cern for the European Community will be the restructuring of the
economic and political power within this new "governance." a
Against this backdrop of Community development, the future role of
the American enterprise in Europe must be determined.4 As adroitly
noted by Keynes some years ago, "[t]he world is not so governed from
above that private and social interests always coincide."6' Whether Amer-
ican direct investment will be significantly curtailed or restricted by
official Community policy in the future, and whether the American firm
will be asked to give more and take less, are political questions which
ultimately must be faced in the 1970's by the European Community. 0
2. (Continued)
Community Community
of Six of Nine USA
Area (thousand sq. mi.) 449 595 8600
Population (millions) 190 251 204
GNP ($ billion) 485 626 998.3
Exports ($ billion) 45.2 560 43.2
Imports ($ billion) 45.6 620 40.0
World Exports (%) 19.2 260 18.4
World Imports (%) 18.3 290 16.0
*Estimated
The figures have been taken from European Community Information Service, Press
Release No. 8, Jan. 22, 1972, and corrected to reflect Norway's decision not to join the
EEC.
8. As noted in the Final Communique of the Conference of the Heads of State or
Governments and Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the European
Community held at The Hague, December 1 and 2, 1969,
Over and above the technical and legal sides of the problems involved, the
expiry of the transitional period at the end of the year has, therefore, acquired
major political significance. Entry upon the final stage of the Common Market
not only means confirming the irreversible nature of the work accomplished
by the Communities, but also means paving the way for a United Europe
capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of mak-
ing a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission.
BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrrm, January 1970, at 12 [hereinafter cited as BULL.
E.C.]. See also Report of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems
of Political Unification (Davignon Report) of Oct. 27, 1970, BULL. E.C., November,
1970, at 9, and Report to the Council and Commission on the Realization by Stages of
Economic and Monetary Union in the Community (Werner Report) of Oct. 8, 1970,
BULL. E.C., Supp. to No. 11, November 1970.
4. For a consideration of the extent of American direct investment in the EEC,
see Report on Transatlantic Direct Investment (Rapporteurs: MM Haekkerup and
Rohner), Eur. Consult. Ass., 23rd Sess., Doc. No. 2988, - Docs. - (1971). American
direct investment in the original six members of the EEC has risen from 0.6 billion
dollars in 1950 to over 10 billion dollars as of 1969, with such investment accounting
for more than 14% of all new industrial development in the EEC.
5. J.M. KEYNES, EssAYS IN PERSUASION 312 (1963).
6. See J.-J. SEavAN-ScHtmBEa, THm AMEBCAN CHALLENoE (1968); Les investissements
dtranger en Europe (Seminaire organis6 par l'Institut d'Administration des Enterprises
de l'Universit6 de Paris, 1968).
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Any present assessment of the compatibility of the American enterprise
in Europe with the developing aims and policies of the European Com-
munity is not possible from a reading of any broad headlines coming
out of Brussels. Such an evaluation must be patched together from the
many separate and seemingly unrelated aspects of European integration,
one of which could well be the proposal for a European-type company.7
It is the purpose of this paper to outline the development of the Euro-
pean-type company concept, and to examine its structure and implica-
tions for American business interests operating or seeking to operate
within the European Economic Community (EEC). It is the author's
belief that despite the assertions about the inherent neutrality of Ameri-
can corporate power in Europe, and the contentions that American
enterprise in Europe is more than paying its ways there is developing
in the EEC a "common attitude" toward American corporate presence. 9
7. For a consideration of the multiple factors that are involved in the formation of a
coherent Community industrial policy see CoMMISsION DES COMMUNAUTPS EUROPAENNFS,
COM No. 70, LA POLITIQUE INDUSrRIELLE DE LA COMMUNAUIr, MEMORANDUM DE LA
COMMISSION AU COUNSEiS (1970).
8. See, e.g., Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational
Law, 83 HARv. L. REv. 739 (1970). For a general discussion of the supposedly neutral
and benevolent nature of the large modern corporation, see Kaysen, The Social Sig-
nificance of the Modern Corporation, Am. ECON. Irv., May 1957, at 311; A.A. BELi,
Tm 20rH CEmuRY CAPrrAL=s- REVOLUTON (1954).
9. It was to the ever-growing and foreign economic power within the EEC that such
thoughtful men as Robert Marjolin, former vice-president of the European Commission,
began to address themselves in the early and mid-sixties. As commented by Marjolin:
"We think that slowing down American direct investment in the industrially developed
countries would also contribute to the general health of our economies. It would be
useful if the Community countries adopted a common attitude on these transactions."
EUROPEAN COIMUNrrY, April 1965, at 5.
The primary institutions that govern the European Communities (EEC, ECSC and
Euratom) have, since July 1, 1967, had the following common organs:
(1) The Council of Ministers: For a consideration of the more important matters of
Community concern, the respective foreign ministers meet approximately once a month.
The Treaty of Rome conceived of the Council as the principal decision-making organ
in the Community.
(2) The European Commission: In the newly expanded Community, this Commission
will consist of either 13 or 14 members selected for their general competence and
independence. Assisted by a staff of over 5,000 "Eurocrats" the Commission is the
prime initiator and formulator of Community actions and policies.
(3) The European Assembly: In the expanded Community, there will be a 198-
member Assembly. Though the Treaty of Rome envisages the direct election of As-
sembly members, these members are presently selected by the various parliaments of
the Member States. The Assembly, which meets monthly, has only minimal effective
political powers.
(4) The European Court of Justice: The Court, sitting in Luxembourg, endeavors
to ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and implementation of the
ECSC, EEC and Euratom treaties.(5) Committee of Permanent Representatives: The Committee is composed of
representatives of the Member States appointed by the Council to serve as a sort of
liason between the Council and Commission.
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Behind the apparently inoffensive and welcoming grin of the European-
type company there does not necessarily await any greeting of substance
for the American enterprise in the "wonderland" of a new European
order.10
GENESIS OF THE IDEA FOR A EUROPEAN-TYPE COMPANY
the emergence of an interest in a European-type company found its
driving force in the midst of post-war European endeavors for sustained
cooperation and integration." For example, the early 1950's saw the
newly established Council of Europe considering the question of a "Eu-
ropean Corporation,"' 2 and saw the rise of a series of European interna-
tional corporations instituted by treaty. These early efforts, however,
did not produce any coordinated and realistic basis for future attempts
toward forming a genuine European-type company. s
But, after the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community
and the EEC made it evident that European integration was a practical
10. A recent statement by the European Commission is indicative of the present mood
of the Community:
A list can be drawn up of the pros and cons of American investments.
There is no denying that they spread economic prosperity and technological
progress. They act as a stimulus to numerous European firms. But this progress
is not, in the first instance of benefit to Europeans. As a number of cases have
shown, as regards employment, research, defence or international trade rela-
tions (notably with state-trading countries) the policies of companies so formed
remain, in the final analysis, the offshoot of industrial, and even political,
headquarters situated outside this continent.
U.S. Investments in Europe: A Memorandum from the Commission's Press Information
Department, in Europe (Agence Internationale d'Information pour la Presse Luxem-
bourg-Bruxelles), No. 591, August 26, 1970 [publication hereinafter cited as Europe].
11. See Calon, La socidtd internationale: elements d'une thdorie gdndrale, 88 JOURNAL
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 694 (1961); Gourrier, La notion d'entreprise commun, les
preddents, rdalisation dans le domaine non nucldaire, 2 Rlvua TRaiuisrRua DRorr
EtOP 9N 383 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rnv. TraM. DR. EuR.].
12. In 1949 a proposal was made for the institution of a free economic sector of
multinational scope which would be open to a limited number of corporations whose
purpose was directly related to the production of necessary goods for the reconstruction
of Europe. See J. RENAULD, DRorr EUROPAE DES SocnkrAs 9.07 (1969). This was followed
by a second proposal which would have limited access to a European company statute
to private firms performing public works or services. Committee on Economic Ques-
tions, Creation of European Companies, Eur. Consult. Ass., 4th Sess., Doe. No. 71, 3Does. 833 (1952).
13. See Ficker, A Project for a European Corporation, 1970 J. Bus. L. 156, 158. After
the Second World War some corporations were established, by multilateral conventions,for the purposes of meeting specfic objectives (i.e., the Mont Blanc Tunnel Explolta-
tdoi Company, the International Company of the Mosell, the Saar-Lorraine Coal
Company, and Eurochemic).
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and workable proposition,14 the concept of a European-type company
took on a fresh significance. In 1959 the possibility and necessity for the
creation of a European corporation was discussed in some detail at a
Congress of French Notaries in Tours.15 In the fall of that same year
Professor Pieter Sanders brought the question to the forefront of Euro-
pean legal thought in his dedication lecture at the School of Economic
Studies in Rotterdam. 6 In 1960 the Council of the Paris Bar made the
subject of a European company the central topic of discussion at their
conference of EEC countries.17 The following year a Congress of the
German Association of Comparative Law considered the problem at
some length.' 8 The EEC Commission also directed its attention to the
idea; however, after receiving an unenthusiastic response in a canvas of
the industrial federations within the EEC, it let the idea fade into the
background for the next five years.' 9
A. THE FRENCH NorE
In an official note to the EEC Council of Ministers and Commission
dated March 15, 1965, the French Government proposed the formation
of a "commercial company of a European type," to be based on a Con-
vention between the Member States of the EEC, which would lead to the
creation and incorporation of a "uniform law" in these countries.20
Recognizing the necessity of harmonizing laws within the EEC, the
French saw their proposal as a means to "augment and accelerate" this
process of harmonization. The permanent objective of their proposal
14. The three treaties forming the basis of the European Communities are: Treaty
Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, done April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]; and Treaty Establishing the
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
167.
15. Thibierge, Le statut des socidtds dtrangers, in 1 LE STAaTr DE L'ATRANGER ET LE
MARcZ COMMUN, (1959), as presented at the 57th Congrls des Notaires de France,
held in Tours.
16. See Sanders, Vers une socidtd anonyme europdenne, 1960 Dnorr EuRoPAEN, No.
16, at 9.
17. See Congras international pour la crdation d'une socidtd commerciale de type
europden, (Paris, June 16-18, 1960), 1960 RLVUE DU MAcHA COMMuN, Supp. to No. 27.
See also Willemetz, Une socidtd de type europden, 1960 RLvUE DU MARCH* COMMUN 38.
18. See Duden, Internationale Aktiengesellschaft, 27 RABELs ZEmrscnuFr rFa Aus-
LANsc Es UND INTERNATIONALEs PrVATREcirr 89, 100 (1962).
19. See D. THOMPSON, THE PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY 8-9 (1969).
20. For a text of the French note, see 2 REv. Tiua. DR. EuR. 409 (1966). An English
translation can be found in [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Developments] CCH
CoMM. MKT. REP. 9025.
1973]
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was "the attainment of the general goals of the Treaty of Rome," and
specifically the promotion of commerce and the facilitation of the right
of establishment within the Community. The immediate objective was
the encouragement of that degree of concentration of enterprises consis-
tent with the preservation of competition. 2'
The practical advantages of this European-type company would be
the furtherance of international business relations, the ability of medium-
sized enterprises in the Member States to organize subsidiaries with
identical bylaws in the other States, and the ability of the larger enter-
prises to exercise more effective control over the operations of their
subsidiaries in other Member States. In addition, adoption of the French
proposal was seen as encouragement for joint ventures for large-scale
European projects, as encouragement for the creation of agencies for
common studies by the enterprises of the different Member States, and
as additional stimulus in European capital investments. 22
In welcoming the French note, the EEC Commission dearly recognized
that the "unspoken purpose of this proposal is to improve the competitive
position of European enterprises in relation to those of third countries
and to give them greater independence from the capital markets outside
the Community."23 The implicit thrust behind the French proposal must
therefore be seen as a definite attempt to help insulate the EEC's in-
dustrial activity from the continually encroaching "American chal-
lenge."2
B. THm CoMMssIoN's MEMORANDUM
A subsequent Commission Memorandum 5 was broadly concerned with
facilitating commercial activities across national frontiers within the EEC.
21. As noted by E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAws 432 (1971),
it was the French Government's view that "concentration [was] the major means for
combating American 'penetration'.....
22. For a further discussion of the French note, see Foyer, Proposition fran~ais de
crdation d'une socidtd de type europden, 1965 RevUE DU MARcsni ComrmauN 268.
23. See EEC Commission, Memorandum on the Establishment of European Com-
panies, BULL. OF THE EuRoprEAN ECONOMIC CoMMuNITY, Supp. to No. 9/10, September/
October 1966, at 6 [hereinafter cited as Commission Memorandum].
24. As noted by Storm, Statute of a Societas Europeae, 5 Comm. MKT. L. Rnv. 265,
267 (1967-68):
There is another reason for the formation of larger units. It is the constantly
growing competition of huge enterprises from outside the Common Market,
especially from the United States of America. Concern about this development
seems to have been one of the main reasons for the French initiative of March,
1965.
25. Commission Memorandum, supra note 23.
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Moreover, it hoped to foster desirable concentrations which would enable
European enterprises to adjust to a vast European market, to the spread
of technical progress, to the requirements of modern scientific research,
and especially to international competition. The central tone of the
Memorandum was that,
[i]n the EEC the generally accepted view-and it is one which is frequently
voiced but much less frequently substantiated-is that in the vital matter of
size European enterprise is at a disadvantage, particularly as compared with its
American rivals.26
In considering the various alternatives the Commission turned its
attention to those provisions of the EEC Treaty which could provide a
possible solution.27 Following this examination, however, the Commission
concluded that these specific articles of the EEC Treaty did not fill
economic requirements and did not make it possible to achieve the
unification of company law.28
Turning next to the French proposal for the adoption of a "uniform
law" creating a European Company, the Commission found it to be "the
first step toward a general harmonization of laws and [that it] would
undoubtedly contribute to a simplification of commercial relations be-
tween Member States."29 Yet despite its feigned neutrality, the Com-
mission impliedly favored as a solution the establishment of a uniform
company type under "European law." Such an approach would differ
from the French plan because this form of European company would
exist as a "European" legal form "side by side" with the various national
laws, and it would come under the control of the European Court of
Justice. Such a situation would run counter to the spirit of French at-
tempts to keep the new corporate form within the individual legal
structures of the countries within the EEC.80
As viewed by the Commission, the principal advantage of a company
under "European law" would be the avoidance of problems related to a
transfer of the corporate seat or to transnational mergers. At present,
26. D. SwANr & D.L. McLAcEmLAr, CONCENTRATION OR CoMPrTboN: A EUROPEAN
DM=MA? 7 (1967).
27. E.g., Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, Arts. 52-58, on establishment; Article 220,
which provides such advantages as equal treatment of foreign persons under national
laws, the abolition of double taxation within the Community, and the mutual recogni-
tion of enterprises throughout the Community; and from a financial and tax stand-
point, Articles 67-73 and 99 and 100.
28. Commission Memorandum, supra note 23, at 13.
29. Id. at 16.
20. See Leleux, Le rapprochement des ldgislations dans la communautd economique
europdene, 1968 CAIM E DRorr Eua'onim 129 [hereinafter cited as CAn. DR. EuE.].
1973]
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under the existing national laws of the Member States of the EEC, each
time a company transfers its corporate seat it must effectually wind up
and begin anew. This subjects the company not only to a serious "psycho-
logical dilemma," but also to the practical financial burden of paying a
varying capital tax upon dissolution on both the disclosed assets and
the hidden reserves of the company.3 1 The Commission stressed that a
uniform company form under "European law" would solve such prob-
lems.
C. THE SANDERS RiEPORT
At the same time as its Memorandum was being prepared, the EEC
Commission had invited Professor Pieter Sanders-Dean of the Law
Faculty at Rotterdam and one of the original initiators of the idea for
a European Company-to prepare and submit within a year a Draft
Statute for a European-type company. With the assistance of a distin-
guished group of company law experts from the five other Member
States, Professor Sanders completed the text of the Draft, along with a
substantial comparative commentary on the general thrust of the Draft
and the specific provisions therein, in January, 1967.82 Essentially the
Draft was to provide future discussions of this topic with une base plus
concrete, however, the Commission was not bound by the Draft and did
not claim responsibility for its contents.8 3
Highly ambitious in scope, the 195-article Sanders Draft is a remark-
31. See R. PENNINGTON, COMPANIES IN THE COMMON MARKEr (2d ed. 1970). Except for
Italy whose company laws allow an enterprise to amalgamate with an enterprise in a
foreign state without having first to wind up, this problem of payment of a capital
tax would also be applicable in those cases involving a merger of enterprises from
different states. For a discussion of the "psychological dilemma" caused to enterprises
under the present European merger situation, see Leleux, Faut-il crder la socidtd
commerciale europdenne pour faciliter I'intdgration dconomique dans la C.E.E.?, 1968
JOURNAL DES TRmUNAUX 109.
32. See COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUT#S EUROPfANNES, COLLECTION P-TUDES: PRoJET
D'UNE STATUT DES Soci fls ANONYMES EUROPLENNES (Series Concurrence, 1967-69) [here-
inafter cited as the SANDERS DRArr]. An English translation of the Sanders Draft was
published in 1969 by Commerce Clearing House.
33. For a consideration of the SANDERS DRAFr see, Chartier, Vers une socidtd de type
europden, 1967 RevuE DU MARCHA COMMUN 310; Lacan, Pour une socidtd anonyme de
type europden, 3 REv. TRIM. DR. EuR. 319 (1967); Sanders, The European Company,
1968 J. Bus. L. 184; Scholten, The European Company, 5 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 9
(1967); E. STEIN, supra note 21, at 447-80; D. THOMPSON, supra note 19; Van der
Groeben, Vers des socidtds anonymes europdennes, necessitd et possibilitd de crder une
socidtd de type europden, 3 REv. TRIM. DR. EuR. 224 (1967). For a highly critical look
at the Draft, see Mann, The European Company, 1970 INr'L & COMP. L.Q. 468, and
Van Ryn, Faut-il instituter la socidtd europdenne?, 1967 JOURNAL TRmUNAUX 377.
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ably well drafted product, though "entirely traditional in its structures
and attributes."84 The Draft Statute is divided into thirteen titles, ten
of which deal with such corporate problems as formation, shares and
rights of shareholders, corporate organs, representation of employees in
management, financial statements and reports, groupes de soci~tds (con-
cerns), modification of the articles of incorporation, winding up pro-
cedure, transformation, and merger.3 5 Titles XII and XIII dealing with
related matters of fiscal and criminal law were purposely left open for
later examination by separate experts in these legal fields. The first title
of the Draft was concerned with general provisions and supplied a work-
ing definition of the new socidtd anonyme europdenne (SE), the require-
ments and the procedure for the establishment of such a company, and
the role of the European Court of Justice with regard to the SE.
After the submission of the Draft to the Commission, the topic was
then referred to the Council of Ministers, which in turn entrusted the
matter to the Committee of Permanent Representatives in Brussels. A
mandate was given to the Committee and to a group of company law
experts (again headed by Professor Sanders) to evaluate the feasibility
of setting up a European company form in light of the Sanders Draft.
As expected, this body reported that the concept of the SE was a viable
one; however, it also crystallized certain basic questions for the Council
of Ministers to consider, namely the questions of supranationality, access
to the SE, employee participation ("co-determination"), and whether or
not shares should consist solely of bearer shares or if some provision
should be made for the Italian system of registered shares.8 6
After much heated debate with the Council of Ministers, the French
Government announced on January 30, 1969, that it was withdrawing
from further discussion of the proposal; the fate of the European com-
pany seemed to have been put to rest.8 7 However, on June 24, 1970, the
European company was given a new lease on life when the Commission
forwarded its own draft (in the form of a Council regulation) to the
Coundl.88 The significance of this event was not only that a move toward
34. See Mann, supra note 33, at 472: "The European Company as envisaged by him
[Prof. Sanders] ... does not substantially differ from the familiar institution existing
almost everywhere."
35. SANDEs DArr, supra note 32, Tits. II-XI.
36. See E. STMN, supra note 21, at 433-37.
37. See Europe, No. 264 (new series), January 31, 1969, at 4.
38. See Proposition de Reglement (GEE) du Conseil fortant statut de la socidtd
anonyme europeenne; 13 E.E.C. J.O. C 124, at 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Commis-
1973]
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the eventual establishment of a uniform corporate form was revived,
but that this time the European Commission presented a working docu-
ment for which it alone bore full responsibility.
H
HIGHUIGHTS OF THE COMMISSION'S DRAFT-REGULATION
The Commission has produced a 284-article Draft-Regulation, with
limited commentary, based in large measure upon the earlier Sanders
Draft. Though the commentary is far from being as comprehensive as
that supplied by Professor Sanders, the Commission's document is, over-
all, a more thorough and precise product. The Commission has filled
in many of the gaps left by the earlier draft (e.g., tax and penal provi-
sions), and has provided a working approach to such problems as the
legal basis of the SE Statute, 9 accessibility to the SE, and the question
of "co-determination." The Commission's Draft-Regulation has rendered
to the Council of Ministers an official Community text on which to base
final consideration and disposition of the matter. As seen by the Com-
mission, the creation of a European-type company is an essential factor
in achieving the conditions required for an internal and integrated
European market; it "is meant to fill a gap in order to serve the aims
of the Treaty [of Rome]." 4°
A. NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF AN SE
Despite some initial misapprehension, 41 the new legal form of the
Societas Europaea was never conceived as an attempt to compete with
and supersede the existing company forms under the municipal laws of
sion's Draft-Regulation]. The English translation of the Draft-Regulation used herein
is taken from BuLL. E. C., Supp. to No. 8, August 1970.
39. While the legal basis of the SE Statute under the Sanders Draft would have
been an international treaty under "European law" the Commission has seen fit in
its draft to enact the Statute by means of a Council regulation pursuant to Article 285
of the Treaty of Rome. As provided for by Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome,
". .. [such a] regulation shall apply generally. It shall be binding in its entirety and
take direct effect in each Member State." The use of a regulation as a legal basis for
the SE Statute, instead of a treaty, would accordingly eliminate much of the confusion
concerning the relation of the SE Statute and municipal law. By the Commission's
Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, the SE Statute would have a truly European character.
For further consideration, see generally, Ficker, The Proposed Statute of a European
Corporation, 1971 J. Bus. L. 167.
40. Sanders, The European Company on its Way, 8 CoMM. MKr. L. RLV. 29, 30 (1971).
41. See, e.g., Duden, supra note 18.
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the Member States.42 The legal form of the SE would serve as une pos-
sibilitd supplementaire for the use of the European business sector and
would exist alongside the present municipal corporate forms.48 In effect
the new form would be entirely optional, having no direct effect upon the
corporate laws of the Member States. The SE, modeled upon those
patterns of stock corporations already existing in the Six, would be of one
form, identical and recognized throughout the EEC.4
The actual corporate structure of the SE is quite generally in line with
the provisions of the Sanders Draft. The main disparities are in details
rather than in substance. The Commission's Draft-Regulation has re-
tained a tripartite internal corporate setup: le Directoire (managing
board), le Conseil de Surveillance (the supervisory board), and L'As-
semblde Gdndrale (the shareholders' meeting).4 5 Also, like the Sanders
Draft, the Draft-Regulation has construed the importance of these cor-
porate organs in light of the developments included in the 1966 French
42. As noted in the SANDERs DArr, sutra note 32, at 16:
The author felt that it was essential to avoid placing the European stock
corporation in a privileged position in relation to national stock corporations.
If this were permitted, there would immediately be competition between the
S.E. Statute and the national stock corporation laws. The author has tried to
avoid such competition because the European stock corporation must not
serve as a form of escape from national provisions that may be considered
burdensome.
43. See Storm, supra note 24, at 266-67:
The S.E. is not meant to replace any of these (municipal] companies. It is an
additional species of the genus "limited company" which is offered to the
business community to take it or leave it. The following point should be em-
phasized: municipal company law will not be directly affected by the SE
Statute.
For a consideration of some of the possible indirect influences on national company
law, see Scholten, supra note 33.
44. As defined in Article I-I of the SANDERs DRAFr, supra note 32: "The European
stock corporation, hereinafter designated as Sodetas Europaea (S.E.), is a company
whose capital is divided into shares and whose obligations are limited to the company's
assets, unless otherwise provided." As noted in the commentary to the Article, Professor
Sanders states that the above definition of the SE "largely corresponds to the definition
of a stock corporation found in the laws of all six countries ......
The form of a limited company whose capital is divided into shares was chosen
for several reasons: the limited company is the form most likely to be selected by an
enterprise intending to do business on an European level; the limited company is
best suited for the protection of the rights of third parties; and there is more
familiarity with the features of the existing municipal forms of this particular limited
company than any other corporate form. It should also be noted that the SE would
always be "a commercial company regardless of the purpose," as there are important
distinctions in France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg between corporations
formed under civil law and those formed under commercial law. For a consideration
of the various types of corporate forms existing in the Member States of the European
Community see R. PENNINCTON, supra note 31; G. ZA, Meou, EUROPEAN BusINESS LAw(1970) and J. RENAULD, Daorr EUROPfEN DES SocIanh (1969).
45. See generally Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, Tit. IV.
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Law on Commercial Companies, by abandoning the mythical idea of the
souverainetd de l'assemblde gdndrale.48 Under the principle that tout
pouvoir demande un contr6le, the Commission's Draft has realistically
focused on the managing board, which is where the greatest measure of
power rests in an SE-size enterprise (i.e., medium and large size enter-
prises). The Draft-Regulation, like the Sanders proposal, endeavors to
ensure a very real counterweight-to the powers of the managing board
by taking meticulous care to safeguard the rights of shareholders. 47
Under the Commission's Draft, the managing board is intended to
play the rdle moteur in the management of the SE and in its corporate
dealings with third parties; it is entrusted with all corporate powers not
specifically delegated to the other organs of the SE 48 However, substantial
control over it is maintained by permanent and continuous supervision
by the supervisory board and by an extension of the powers of the share-
holders.49 For example, the managing board is required to submit a
quarterly report on corporate activities to the supervisory board.50 Fur-
ther, the supervisory board has unrestricted rights of inspection and
access to corporate documents,51 and has various powers with regard to
46. See Loi du 24 Jullet 1966 (No. 66-537) Sur les Sodt&s Commerciales, 1966 J.O.
6402, 1966 D.S.L. 265, as supplemented by D6cret du 23 Mars 1967 (No. 67-236) Sur
les Sodt&s Commerdales, 1967 J.O. 2843, 1967 D.S.L. 137. For an analysis of the
French legislation, see Didier, The New French Legislation on Commercial Companies,
1967 J. Bus. L. 78.
47. As noted in the commentary to the SANDEas DRAFr, supra note 32, at 114: "It
is no longer the shareholders' meeting that dominates companies the size of an S.E.,
if in fact it ever really did. The real power rests with the company's management.
The idea of the 'sovereignty' of the shareholders' meeting has been completely aban-
doned." Cf. Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 88, Arts. 62-72.
48. The Board of Management is responsible for managing the affairs of the
company. In most large undertakings it will be collective in character and
thereby encourage the build-up of the team spirit required in the administra-
tion of contemporary business. The Board of Management will be the motivat-
in force of the company and its means of contact with third parties.
Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, at 55.
49. Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 88, Arts. 73(l), 83. Although the
Board of Management is left with considerable freedom with regard to the internal
organization of the SE, the Supervisory Board "may at any time make regulations
for the internal operation of the Board of Management." Id. Art. 64(2). Moreover,
without affecting the rights of third parties, the Board of Management must seek
prior authorization from the Supervisory Board in specified matters concerning the
termination or transfer of the whole or substantial part of the enterprise, significant
restrictions or extensions of the activities of the enterprises, substantial internal organiza-
tional changes, the establishment of long-term cooperation with other enterprises or
the termination thereof, and any other managerial activities specified in the articles
of incorporation. Id. Art. 66. Additionally, the Board of Management members are
appointed by the Supervisory Board and when justified, they can be removed from
office by the Supervisory Board. Id. Art. 63.
50. Id. Art. 68.
51. Id. Art. 78.
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the preparation of company accounts and the institution of legal actions
based on liability of the members of the managing board. 52 A member
of the supervisory board represents the company in agreements between
the company and a member of the board of management.5 Finally, the
most important function of the supervisory board is that it serves as an
advisor to the managing board, though it may not directly intervene in
the daily operation of the SE.54
The powers of the shareholders are also exhaustively defined. They
have the ultimate power in the increase or reduction of corporate capital,
the issue of convertible debentures, the appointment or dismissal of the
managing board, the appointment of auditors, the allocation of annual
profits, the modification of the articles of incorporation, the winding
up of the company, the conversion of the company, the merger or transfer
of all or a substantial part of corporate assets, and in the approval of
various types of contracts binding on the SE.55 In addition, detailed care
has been given to protecting and guaranteeing their preemptive rights,
their power to call for all necessary information for voting purposes,
their right to be able to buy and sell shares at their discretion, and their
right to safeguards against "inside dealings" by members of the manag-
ing board.56 As one writer has commented, "the draft-regulation contains
one of the most advanced corporation laws known today."57
52. Id. Arts. 72, 211-214.53. Id. Art. 73(3).54. Id. Arts. 73(2), 73(3).
55. Id. Art. 83. As noted by the Commission in its commentary to the Article,
the powers conferred are exhaustive, and the shareholders have only those specific
powers which are conferred upon them by the Article.
56. Id. See especially Arts. 82, 90. As with the SANDEas DaAFr, supra note 32, the
Commission's draft ensures a very real counterweight to the everyday corporate powers
of the Board of Management by taking meticulous care in ensuring the rights of
shareholders. As noted by Professor Sanders:
Generally speaking, shareholders take little interest in the management of the
company. Their interests center rather on the results and distribution of
dividends .... The shareholders are more in need of appropriate protection
of their interests [e.g., preemptive rights, access to information] than of man-
agerial powers.
Id. at 114-15. It should also be noted that Article 85 of the Commission's Draft-Regula-
tion, supra note 38, provides for the protection of the rights of certain minority
shareholders in requesting meetings and placing items on the agenda. The general
supervision of the rights of all shareholders is left in the hands of the appropriate
national courts.
57. Storm, A New Impulse Towards a European Company, 26 THE Bus. LAwYE
1446 (1971). On the nature and scope of the Commission's Draft-Regulation, see also
Saint-Esteben, La proposition d'un statut des socidtds anonymds europdennes prsentde
par la Commission au Conseil le 30 Juin 1970, 7 REv. TPar. DR. Eu. 62 (1971); Van
Ryn, Le projet de statut des socidtds europdennes, 7 REv. TRIM. DR. EUm. 563 (1971);
Keutgen & Huyo, Demain la Socidtd Europdenne, 1971 J. TRmuNaAux 485.
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B. AccE SsiBrY
One of the most controversial aspects of the debate surrounding the
European-type company, and one of the most relevant considerations for
the American enterprise, is that of accessibility to the SE form. This
question has both significant intra- and extra-Community ramifications.'
On the intra-Community level, the French Government's argument has
been that the conditions of access to the SE should not be more severe
than those presently existing in the Member States-every local European
enterprise should be afforded an equal opportunity of becoming an SEP
Countering this approach is the German Government's attitude that
there must first exist certain internationale Tatsbestinde (certain inter-
national factors) before access should be given;60 otherwise the SE would
become a device for entrepreneurial expediency rather than for set
economic objectives. The Germans also fear that broad access might
place the SE in competition with municipal law.
The Draft-Regulation, like the Sanders Draft, only permits pre-existing
joint-stock companies as founders of an SE. Though no set period of
previous corporate existence is required, only stock companies "incor-
porated under the law of a Member State and of which not less than two
are subject to different national laws may establish an SE by merger or
by formation of a holding company or joint subsidiary."Ol Since no
international factors would be present in a situation permitting the
transformation of a single national corporation into an SE, this has been
excluded as a possibility by the Commission. 2 However, to offset this
58. The first, if not the foremost, among the unresolved "hard core" issues is
the question what type of enterprise should be admitted to incorporation
under the European law and under what circumstances.... For some authors
and perhaps also for some of the Governments concerned, the very "raison
d'etre" of the new institution [the SE] may depend upon the way this hotly
disputed issue is resolved.
E. STEN, supra note 21, at 455.
59. See Foyer, Proposition frangais de crdation d'une socidtd de type europden, 1965
RtvuE MAcsuA Com tra 268.
60. See Gessler, Grundfragen der Europdischer Handelsgeseilsehaft, 1967 BnmE.
sBERATmt 581. Professor Gessler has proposed the following criteria of access: if an
enterprise has establishments or subsidiaries in states of the Community other than
the one where it has its corporate seat; if an enterprise participates in other enterprises
having their corporate seats outside the home state of the company; if there are
quotations on the stock exchanges of two or more Member States of the Community.
With such criteria it is felt that there would be an assurance that an enterprise would
have sufficient "European" aspects to merit the use of the SE form.
61. Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, Art. 2. Cf. the SANDERS DRArr,
supra note 32, Art. 1-3(l).
62. See BuLL. E. C., August 1970, at 75-76. By Article 3 of the Commission's Draft-
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restriction, the Commission has followed the French plan, and extended
access to the SE form to medium-size firms involved in European opera-
tions. This has been accomplished by requiring a lesser amount of capital
for formation of an SE than that stated in the Sanders Draft.63 In effect,
the Commission, while actually moving closer to the German position,
has tried to propose a compromise to foster intra-Community accessibility.
Considering whether non-EEC enterprises should be permitted to
avail themselves of the SE form, Professor Sanders has dearly stated that,
"[t]he European company is, first of all, meant for the business world
of the Common Market."" For "economic reasons" the Sanders Draft
did not totally preclude foreign utilization of the SE form, 5 but the
Commission's Draft has taken a stricter view of the matter. Finding it
essential that all companies involved in the formation of an SE be com-
pletely under the jurisdiction of the EEC, the Draft-Regulation precludes
any direct foreign use of the SE form.66 As the SE can only be formed
by stock companies incorporated under the laws of a Member State, the
only way a foreign firm could indirectly participate in the SE would be
through a wholly owned subsidiary incorporated within the EEC.67
The Commission's draft has significantly deviated from the Sanders
Draft concerning the question of foreign access to the SE form.68 This
Regulation, supra note 38, an SE already in existence may itself form an SE sub-
sidiary or merge with other SE's or with stock companies incorporated under the
national law of a Member State.
63. The minimum capital requirement for the formation of an SE is 500,000 units
of accounts (which roughly correspond to the gold-parity of the United States dollar
in 1934) in the case of merger or creation of a holding company, 250,000 units of
accounts in the case of the establishment of a joint subsidiary, and 100,000 units of
account in the case of the establishment of a subsidiary by an existing SE. Commis-
sior's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, Art. 4. The ECC Savings Bank's suggestions
on the capital requirements for the SE, in contrast, indicate a feeling that the European
Court of Justice should be able to grant exemptions to the requirements, and that
there should not be different capital limits for the cases of mergers and the formation
of subsidiaries. Europe, No. 958 (new series), January 8, 1972 at 8.
For the capital requirements found in the munidpal corporate laws in the Com-
munity see R. PENIrNGTON, supra note 31, and see the SANDERs DArT, supra note 32,
Art. 1-3(2).
64. Sanders, The European Company, 1968, J. Bus. L. 184, 193.
65. See the SANDERs DRA T, supra note 82, at 10. By Article I-2(1)(b), a European
stock corporation may be formed by "stock corporations which are established in a
state that is not a member of the European Economic Community and which has
been engaged in economic activities for the last three fiscal years prior to the applica-
tion to record the S.E."
66. Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, Art. 2.
67. See Storm, A New Impulse Towards a European Company, supra note 57, at 1448.
68. Compare Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, Arts. 2 & 3 with the
SANDERs DRAFT, supra note 32, Arts. 1-2 & 1-3. For a report of the debate on the subject
of access to the SE see Europe, No. 250 (new series), January 13, 1969, at 3.
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shift is perhaps indicative of a growing protectionist approach against
non-EEC enterprises. Whether the EEC will move even closer in the
future to the French concept of a "truly European enterprise" still re-
mains to be seen.,o
C. CO-DETERMINATION: EMPLOYEE PARTCIPATON 70
The notion of representation of employees within the corporate organs
of the SE is peculiarly a product of German experience (Mitbestim-
mung).71 In Germany, except for family companies with fewer than 500
employees, all stock corporations (Aktiengesellschaft) must provide for
the election, by the firm's employees, of one-third of the representatives
on the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat),72 and, in the area of coal and
steel, employee representation is even greater.78 Co-determination does
not exist in the company laws of the other Member States, except in
France where a much watered-down version exists (co-gestion).74
In commenting on whether co-determination should have a place in
the European-type company, one writer has remarked that
[t]he problem is a political one. It is closely connected to the determination as
to who should have access to the European corporation. Legal solutions may be
worked out. The main difficulties lie in the differences of labour law regulations
in the member states and in the divergent opinions of the different national
labour unions on this problem. All solutions have to respect one principle:
neither should the economic and social development of the Common Market
be hampered nor one member state be excluded from a common and necessary
economic development.75
69. See E. SrMN, supra note 21, at 458-60.
70. See generally Lyon-Caen, La reprdsentation des intdrests des travailleurs dans
les socidtds europdennes, 7 Rzv. T~an. DR. EUR. 473 (1971).
71. See Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
80 HARV. L. REv. 23 (1966).
72. See Betriebsverfassungsgesetz §§ 76-77 (C.H. Beck 1953). In contrast to the French
system of "participation," the employee representatives share the same rights as any
other member of the Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board).
73. Mitbestimmungsgesetz of May 21, 1951, [1951] BGB1. I 347. Here the employee
representatives must constitute 50% of the Supervisory Board, and there is a neutral
president. In addition, the employees are empowered to elect an Arbeitsdirehtor
(Labor Representative) to sit as a full participating member on the Vorstand (Board
of Management). The Mitbestimmungsgesetz of Aug. 7, 1956, extends "co-determina-
tion" to holding companies in the iron, steel, and coal industries.
74. See Article 3 of the Ordonnance du 22 F~vrier 1945 (No. 45-280), Institutuant
des Comit's d'Entreprises, as amendled Loi du 16 Mai 1946 (No. 46-1065), 1946 J.O.
4251, 1946 D.L. 227, as amended, Dcret du 24 Juin 1960 (No. 60.606), 1960 J.O. 5816,
1960 DS.L. 231, as amended, Loi du 18 Juin 1966 (No. 66-427), 1966 J.O. 5267, 1966
D.S.L. 297.
75. Ficker, supra note 13, at 169.
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It was apparently left for the Commission to resolve this troublesome
situation within the conditions existing in the Member States.76
The Commission has, however, come up with a highly comprehensive,
innovative and non-neutral approach, one which it sees as "indispensable
if the way to [the] constructive co-operation between employers and
workers [which] it feels [is] necessary in European firms is to be opened
up."7 Recognizing the legal and factual relationship of the worker with
the enterprise and the need to ensure the protection of the worker's
legitimate interests, the Commission has concluded that the SE should
embrace the concept of co-determination as one of the legal means in
encouraging cooperation between workers and management and between
the workers in the different Member States.78
In great detail, the Commission's Draft-Regulation proposes to deal
with the question of worker participation on three fronts: (1) by the
creation of a new body called the European Works Council (comitJ
europden d'entreprise), which would represent the workers in each
establishment in those cases where the SE has establishments in more
than one EEC state,79 (2) through the presence of employee representa-
tives on the supervisory board of the SE,80 and (3) through the possibility
76. For the details of the complex compromise treatment of the question of how to
neutralize the problem of "co-determination," see the SANDERs DRAYF, supra note 32,
Article V et seq., which sets out a course of three variant approaches. For a critique
see Lyon-Caen, Contribution a l'etude des modes de reprdsentation des intdrjts des
travailleurs dans le cadre des socidtds anonymes europdennes (S&ies Concurrence,
1970-10).
77. BuLL. E.C., August 1970, at 78.
78. Commission's Draft-Regulation, suftra note 38, Tit. V, Arts. 100-142.
79. Id. Arts. 100-136. In every SE having establishments in more than one Member
State there must exist a European Works Council (EWC). The EWC shall be elected
and except in specific cases it shall exist alongside any other existing works council formed
in the SE according to the relevant national laws. Id. Arts. 101, 105. By Article 120(3)
the EWC shall be informed by the Board of Management "of every event of im-
portance" concerning the functioning of the enterprise; by Article 122 of the EWC
may request from the Board of Management information on any matter it deems of
importance, and it may subsequently render an "opinion" on the matter in question.
Further, by Articles 124 and 125, the Board of Management must consult with the
EWC before deciding certain matters (e.g., job evaluations, substantial organizational
changes within the enterprise); and by Article 123, the Board of Management must
obtain prior approval from the EWC in various other matters (e.g., promotions, dis-
missal rules).
In effect, the Commission has proposed a new corporate institution which would
possess specific and real powers of investigation, consultation and approval within
the decision-making apparatus of the SE.
80. Id. Arts. 137-145. Unlike the complex equation of the SANDERS DRAxr, supra
note 32, the Commission has generally provided for a fixed minimum representation
of workers (one-third of the members of the Supervisory Board) unless the articles of
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of concluding collective agreements between the SE and the labor unions
represented within the SE.81 Though the Commission's draft has pre-
sented a complete regulation concerning the labor aspects involved in the
operation of an SE, it nevertheless "demands quite a lot of imagination
from the reader to visualize how this system will work out in practice."
As further noted by Professor Sanders, "[t]he last word on this subject
has certainly not been said."82
D. RoE or Tm EuRoPEAN COURT oF JusTmm
To help ensure the desired "European" character of the SE, the Com-
mission's Draft-Regulation, like the Sanders Draft, has given a central
role to the Court of Justice at Luxembourg. At the same time it has tried
to preserve as much as possible the competency of the municipal courts
in this area; however, in the event of any conflict between national and
Community law, Community law will take precedence.88 In order to
guarantee uniformity of status, the Draft-Regulation provides that,
ti]t is imperative that the founding of the European company be subject to
a system of registration at a central registry, under legal control, to eliminate
any possibility of invalidity of the company after incorporation; [that] one spe-
cific European legal body should be seised of this control in order to avoid
discrepancies of judgment in the scrutiny of deeds and documents prepared by
the founders; and [that] the requisite authority should naturally be vested in
the judicial body of the Communities, the Court of Justice of the European
Commulnities.84
Under the Draft-Regulation, the Court of Justice will provide the
desired uniformity and control in the formation of the SE by control
over the registration procedure.8 5 The Court will have a further and
continuing role in providing a uniform interpretation of the SE Regula-
tion through the procedure of granting preliminary rulings.8 0
incorporation provide for a higher percentage. However, if two-thirds of the employees
of the SE object to the principle of "co-determination" then no worker representatives
will be placed on the Supervisory Board.
81. Id. Arts. 146-147.
82. Sanders, supra note 40, at 38.
83. On supremacy in Community law, see Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case No. 6-64, 10
REcuEIL DE LA JUusPRUDEN E 1141 (1964).
84. See Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, Preamble.
85. Id. Arts. 17, 19.
86. Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, at 76, provides for a pre-
liminary ruling on the interpretation of the SE Regulation. Where such a question
"is raised before any court or tribunal of one on the Member States, that court or
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable
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The basis of the Court of Justice's role in supervising the application
and interpretation of the SE Regulation would stem from the general
principles of the Treaty of Rome and from the Regulation itself.s 7 In
matters of interpretation by municipal courts or by the European Court
of Justice itself, the Commission's Draft-Regulation distinguishes three
sources of applicable law. In those matters directly or indirectly governed
by the final SE Regulation, disposition shall be made in accordance with
the provisions of the Regulation; failing this, the general principles upon
which the Regulation is based will be used; and failing this, the rules
and general principles common to laws of the Member States will be
used as the basis for disposition. In those matters concerning the SE
which are not governed by the Regulation the relevant municipal law
shall apply.88 As stated by the Commission,
[t]he Statute [Draft-Regulation] thus endeavours to define the boundaries to the
concept of matter governed by this Statute. This concept, like all other rules of
the Statute, is itself made subject to interpretation by the Court of the Euro-
pean Communities.89
The role of the Court of Justice in the functioning of the SE Regula-
tion is seen by the Commission as a most significant and crucial one. The
Commission is in fact proposing a uniform solution on a supranational
level, that is, a uniform Council of Ministers Regulation as the legal
basis of the SE Statute and a uniform interpretation of the Regulation
provided by the Court at Luxembourg. In this light, the Commission's
Draft-Regulation must be seen as a conscious contribution to the con-
tinuing development of Community law.90
it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon," and where
such a question "is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member
State, from whose decisions there is no possibility of appeal under internal law, that
court or tribunal shall be bound to bring the matter before the Court of Justice."
87. Under the SANDERs DRAFT, supra note 32, Art. 1-6(5), provision was made for
the continental practice of pourvoi dans l'intdrt de la loi (an advisory opinion which
does not prejudice the rights of the parties involved), whereby the Avocat-Gdndral
of the European Court may submit to the Court the question of whether the national
court has violated any provision of the Statute which is adjudicable by the European
Court. Such provision is not made under the Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra
note 88, as recourse here can be had under Article 169 of the Treaty of Rome, supra
note 14, at 75.
88. Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, Art. 7.
89. Id. at 15 (notes on Art. 7, para. 4).
90. On the nature of Community law, see generally A.W. GRaN, PomcAI INTEGRA-
TION BY JURIsPRUDENcE (1969); E. STEIN & P. HAY, LAw AND INsTrrUTIONS IN TaE ATLANTic
AA 133-230 (1963).
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E. CERTAIN OTHER PROBLEMS
Concerning the all-pervasive corporate problem of taxation, the Com-
mission in large measure based its draft provisions on the two draft
Directives regarding taxation which were forwarded to the Council of
Ministers in January, 1969.91 The Commission's approach to taxation
of the SE rests on the premise of non-discrimination; the tax laws of the
EEC must apply to the SE in the same manner as they apply to any other
municipal company. The Commission has ruled out any 'special pro-
visions favorable to the SE.92
In the formation of the SE, the Council Directive on indirect taxation
is generally applicable. However, by the Commission's Draft-Regulation,
the exchange of shares involved in the formation of an SE holding com-
pany does not give rise to any tax. In the event these shares are held by
an enterprise, the new shares must then be shown in the balance sheet
of the enterprise at the same value as the old shares.93
As set out in the Draft-Regulation, the SE shall, for purposes of taxa-
tion, be treated as a resident of the Member State in which 'the "center
of its effective management" is located. In the event of a dispute arising
on this point, the contending fiscal authorities may request~that a final
determination be made by the Court of Justice at Luxembourg. After
a period of five years an SE may transfer its "center of effective manage-
ment" to another Member State without incurring any tax on the
transfer.94
A "permanent establishment 95 would be taxed only in the state where
it is located. If, during any tax period, a consolidated loss results from
91. See Draft Directive on the Common Taxation Arrangements Applicable to
Mergers, the Splitting Up of Companies and the Transfer of Assets Taking Place
B~etweer Companies of Different Member States, 12 E.E.C. J.O. C 39, at 1 (1969); Draft
Directive on the Common Taxation Arrangements Applicable to Parent Companies
and Subsidiary Companies of Different Member States, 12 E.E.C. J.O. C 39, at 7 (1969).
92. Special provisions would not only run counter to the principles of modern tax
law, which tend to attach more importance to the function and business structure of
undertakings than to its legal form, but would also deliberately create new sources
of distortion and discrimination detrimental to free and effective competition and
inconsistent with fiscal neutrality. Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, at 215.
93. Id. Art. 275.
94. Id. Arts. 276-277.
95. "The expression 'permanent establishment' means a fixed place of business at
which an S.E. carries on its activities in whole or in part." Id. Art. 280. The Article
also provides that a seat of management, a branch, a factory, a workshop, and other
similar situations may constitute a "permanent establishment." Id.
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the "permanent establishments" of an SE, that loss would be deductible
from the taxable profits of the SE in the state in which it is a resident for
tax purposes. Further, the "permanent establishments" which an SE has
in a state other than its fiscal seat would not give rise to a greater tax by
that state than those imposed there on other enterprises carrying on busi-
ness of a similar nature.98 Article 281 of the Commission's Draft-Regula-
tion deals with the case of subsidiaries in which an SE holds at least 50%
of the capital, these provisions being analogous to those of Article 278
regarding losses incurred by "permanent establishments."9 7 Article 281
makes it possible to set-off profits and losses of enterprises which are
legally distinct, yet part of a larger "economic unit." These provisions
are, however, of "a provisional character [and] will have to be adapted
to future developments and especially to further directives in this field."98
At a minimum, one sound lesson that can be drawn from the proposed
SE tax provisions is that a European-type company may have more than
one registered office without having more than one domicile for tax
purposes. For various reasons, the Commission finds it imperative that
an SE should have only one domicile for tax purposes, and that domicile
is where the "center of effective management" is located.99 If the SE tax
provisions are read in conjunction with the draft Directives of 1969, it
becomes evident that the Commission is committed to taking a firm
stance against abuse of the corporate domicile for tax purposes; the
Commission's attitude signals the end of the days of the "tax haven" in
certain European countries.10o
F. RYLATED AND AFFIATED ComPANES
The Commission's Draft-Regulation raises the question of "groups of
companies" (i.e., related or affiliated companies which act as an economic
unit, but which are legally distinct entities), a subject which has been
96. Id. Arts. 278-279.
97. The present Article [Art. 281] makes it possible to set off losses and profits
of undertakings which are legally independent. It thus seeks to substitute for
the narrow legal concept of the taxpayer the wider economic concept of the
"group of companies" which, although legally independent, nevertheless form
an economic unit treated for tax purposes as one undertaking.
Id. at 223.
98. Sanders, supra note 40, at 45.
99. See Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, at 216-17.
100. See generally E. STmN, supra note 21, at 470-72. On the harmonization of
European tax laws, see Vogellar, Tax Harmonization in the European Community,
7 Cobim. AKT. L. Rav. 523 (1970).
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treated systematically only under German law.10' The Commission starts
from the premise that such "groups of companies" do exist, and then
extends the provisions of the Draft-Regulation to any such group in
which an SE is either directly or indirectly the controlled or controlling
enterprise in the group. For the American enterprise, it is important to
note that these provisions are applicable to non-Community enterprises
as well as to Community ones.' 02
The Draft-Regulation seeks to establish a legal framework in which
the interests of the groups of affiliated and related companies can be
reconciled with those of minority shareholders and creditors. In this
light, the management of the controlled enterprise of the "group" is
obliged to follow the instructions of the controlling enterprise (whose
registered office must be situated in one of the Member States), regardless
of the interests of the controlled company. To protect the rights of the
minority shareholders of a controlled company whose seat is in one of the
Member States, provision is made for these shareholders to exchange
their shares for shares of the controlling company (if it is an SE or limited
company of one of the Member States) or to settle for a cash payment as
soon as the company becomes a member of a "group." To help safe-
guard the rights of creditors, the Draft-Regulation provides that the
controlling company is jointly and severally liable for all the obligations
of the dependent undertakings. The Commission has also made provision
for the publication of certain notices with regard to whether an SE forms
part of a "group" or not.103
HI
IMPIUCATIONS FOR AMERICAN BUSINESS
A. SHO T-Tm'v
Aside from a spark of initial curiosity, it is hard to conceive of a com-
mon SE form having any immediate advantages for the corporate activ-
ities of American enterprises in Europe (or the ones seeking to enter
Europe). Even for European firms, the SE is a highly dubious creature.
It is primarily geared to the needs of certain medium-sized firms wish-
101. See F. JEUNGER & L. Scnmnr, GmAN Srocx COPORATON Acr (1967).
102. Commission's Draft-Regulation, supra note 38, Art. 240.
103. Id. Arts. 223-240.
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ing to expand within the European market. 104 For the large American
multinational corporations, the SE offers no guaranteed solutions to the
legal and economic problems now being handled on a day-to-day basis
by the large staff of professional experts employed by these firms. In fact,
if a large American firm were able to choose the SE form, the metaphor-
ical balance sheet could well show that it had lost more flexibility of
operation than it had gained. Scrutiny and control of the enterprise
would in large measure come from the centralized bureaucracy of the
EEC structure itself, with all the supranational implications that would
entail. Gone would be the leverage now successfully utilized by the large
American enterprise in playing off one Member State against another.' 05
In addition, the American enterprise would of necessity have to come
to terms everywhere in the Community with such bothersome concepts
as "co-determination,"' 1 6 the Community's interpretation of what may
or may not constitute the seat of corporate power and control, and the
notion of "groups of companies." Concerning the SE form as facilitating
mergers, this has never been an overriding obstacle for an American
enterprise's penetration of European markets. The formation of sub-
sidiary companies, holding companies, or agencies are part and parcel
of the mastered experience of American corporate ingenuity. 07
As soundly learned from experience in the United States, the creation
of a federal-type corporate form is not crucial. What is crucial is the
guarantee of such basic rights as freedom of establishment ("doing busi-
ness"), the free movement of capital, and the mutual recognition of
companies throughout the integrated market. Equally important are
104. Id. Art. 2.
105. Under present conditions the American enterprise has a real opportunity to
play off the various Member States against each other. For example, if entry into
France would prove restrictive, a country like Belgium inevitably holds out open arms
to the American enterprise (e.g., Westinghouse's recent acquisition of Ateliers de
Construction Electrique de Charleroi (ACECG in Belgium). As noted by Gilbertson,
A Hospitable Home for Foreign Firms, International Herald Tribune, Nov. 13, 1970,
at 13: "Unlike their neighbours to the South and East, the Belgians have not reacted
unfavorably to the incoming tide of U.S. corporations . . . . Public opinion as a
whole has supported the welcoming policy of its Governments." Situations like this,
inevitably, afford the American enterprise considerable bargaining flexibility. See also
Europe, No. 681 (new series), November 6, 1970.
106. It appears that quite a few American subsidiaries have already had to grapple
with co-determination. Many have undercapitalized to stay out of the requirements of
the Misbestimmungsgesetz; others (e.g., John Deere Co. in Drasseldort) have found that
there is no practical deterrent in the system except for greater disclosure requirements.
See DeVries & Juenger, Limited Liability Contract: the GmbH, 64 COLuM. L. Rnv. 866
(1964).
107. See Report on Transatlantic Direct Investment, supra note 4. See also The Euro.
company: Making It Easy To Go Multinational, 239 EcoNomswr, June 12, 1971, at 46-47.
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uniform and advantageous provisions for corporate taxation, for cur-
rency controls, and for securities regulations.108 None of these crucial
matters are dealt with by the proposed SE Draft-Regulation.
Concerning the practical and immediate advantages of the SE for the
multinational corporation, Dr. F. A. Mann, in a very acute and devas-
tating attack on the SE proposal, has stated that:
Daily practice has failed to produce any evidence to the effect that there are
gaps which could at present not be filled, that there is a need which could not
be satisfied, that business men [sic] have experienced any substantial difficulty
in practice. The truth of the matter is that such difficulties as there are (and
they are real and substantial) stem from a source which the Draft Statute of a
European Company law does not even touch, and which would continue even
if it were accepted.... Anyone who has ever participated in practical discus-
sions about these problems, anyone who has ever witnessed the business man's
[sic] motives and reactions, anyone who has ever had to consider the interests
of the investing public in connection with the enormous field of Eurodollar
finance will agree that the absence of a European company has made no differ-
ence, that, indeed, questions of company law have attracted only a minimum
of attention and that the available tools provided by company law have proved
s..i.... In the end one cannot help feeling that the discussion about a
European company involves some exaggeration and disproportion.109
From Mann's vantage point, it would indeed be very hard to argue that
the SE form would hold out any immediate practical significance to an
American firm in the EEC.
B. LONG-TERm
On a more widely projected basis, the crucial significance of the pro-
posed SE is precisely that this new corporate form is not intended for
use by the American enterprise. Quite the contrary, the prime focus is
for an essentially "European" usage, especially by medium-sized Euro-
pean firms seeking to expand on a European scale. The driving force be-
hind the SE proposal is the development of practical situations which
are conducive to the establishment of truly competitive European econ-
omies of scale, while keeping these situations within dose Community
control. In realistic terms, this means competitive with the large Amer-
ican multinational corporations.
In order to facilitate these objectives, this writer feels that during the
coming decade American enterprise will come to face a series of formal
controls from the EEC, both as to its entry and its actual manner of
108. Leleux, Corporation Law in the United States and in the E.E.C., 5 COMM. MKT.
L. REv. 133 (1967-68).
109. Mann, supra note 38, at 479-80.
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"doing business" therein. While a fully coordinated EEC policy toward
foreign multinational corporations is not imminent, elements of such
a developing attitude undoubtedly will be reflected in the various forth-
coming Community directives on taxation, corporate reform, antitrust
policy, and the program on free movement of capital, establishment and
services. It will be essential for the corporate counsels of the American
enterprises in Europe to keep abreast of developments in these areas and
not to treat them as isolated and separate Community actions.
Of equal importance is what may be termed the "psychological" sig-
nificance of the SE-not only as it may be for the EEC itself-but also
for the many inferences it raises for American enterprises in Europe. In
essence, the proposal for the SE provides a psychological spur to, and a
forum for discussion on a Community level of, the overall corporate and
economic problems facing Western Europe. For example, as a partial
result of the broad discussion given to the SE during the 1960's, a pro-
posed fifth directive on company law harmonization has recently been
issued by the European Commission. This proposed directive anticipates
approximation of the national corporate laws of the EEC Member States
along lines largely similar to the SE Draft-Regulation's approach to the
"dual" directorate, the extensive protection of shareholders' rights, em-
ployee's participation on the supervisory board, and the procedures for
the drawing up and inspection of annual statements.110
The proposal for the SE does not attempt to supplant the basic need
for the harmonization of the national company laws of the Member States
and the necessity for the coordination of a genuinely European industrial
and economic policy; it does, however, in a very real way serve as a hand-
maid toward the attainment of these goals.' Whether it be in the exten-
sion of the role of the European Court in European corporate matters,
the interrelated need for the harmonization of national tax regulations
(along with those on securities and exchange controls), the creation of
competitive European economies of scale, or the debate over the very
status of American enterprises within the EEC, the proposal for the SE
provides the juncture point in dealing with these pressing problems fac-
110. See Commission of the European Communities, Fifth Directive on Company Law
Harmonization Proposed, An Information Memo, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 9532.
111. For a consideration of the overall significance of the European company to the
attainment of a common EEC industrial policy see CoMMsssoN DES COMMUNAUTAS EURO-
PANNEs, COM No. 70, LA PoLmrIQUE INDUSnrELLE DE LA COMMUNAUTA, MEMOANDUM DE
LA COMMISSION AU CONSEIL (1970).
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ing the EEC in the 1970's.n 2 The significance of the SE for the American
enterprise is, therefore, not from the aspect of personal use, but because
the SE serves as a prime indicator of what the Community idea is all
about."83
112. "[F]or the convinced 'Euroeans' the 'European company' offered both a new
symbol and a new potential incentive for the lagging integration movement." E. STMN,
supra note 21, at 431.
113. This writer contends that a common attitude is developing toward the American
enterprise in Europe, and that the debate behind the European Corporation is one of
the prime indicators of the development of such a consensus. Other indicators also
evidence this phenomenon: (1) the Convention Relating to the Mutual Recognition of
Companies and Legal Persons (see 2 CCH CoMM. Mar. l~s. 6083-6107), Article 3 of
which states tat, if the relevant companies or legal persons do not have "a genuinelink with the economy of one of these territories," the Member States may refuse to
apply the Convention to such persons or companies; (2) the continuing debate on
accessibility to the proposed European Patent Convention by non-EEC states (see M.
van Emxpel, European Patent Conventions, 9 Coas.s. Mar. L. REV. 13 [1972]); (3) the
current dispute concerning applicability of the freedom of establishment (Treaty ofRom , supra note 14, Arts. 52-58) to companies which may not have a "genuine onk"with the Common Market; and (4) the general controversy over the role of the multi-national firm in the Common Market (see 2 C OMM. iT. REP., Report No. 189
[June 20, 1972]).
